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As Others See Us
APPORTIONMENT OF DIVIDENDS
In a note in the November number of the Harvard
Law Review,' it is stated that "commentators have almost
without exception approved the Pennsylvania rule" as to
the distribution of corporate dividends between successive
beneficiaries of a trust; and that "the experience of courts
following the Pennsylvania rule has led them to extend
rather than restrict the doctrine ;" and that "for the sake of
consistency, it may be hoped that a late Pennsylvania de-
cision,2 awarding rights to subscribe to the life tenant, will
carry weight in those states where the question has not
yet arisen".
The note, however, calls attention to the fact that in
New York, which adopted the Pennsylvania rule, the com-
plicated inquiries of fact involved in apportionment induced
the legislature to enact the Massachusetts rule as to stock
dividends, and that, largely for the same reason, the Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws have advocated the
adoption of the Massachusetts rule in toto.'
GIFTS OF CHOSES IN ACTION
The Restatement of the Law of Contracts' provides:
The right acquired by the assignee under a gratuitous as-
signment is revocable by the assignor's death, by a sub-
sequent assignment by the assignor, or by notice from the
assignor received by the assignee or the obligor, unless:
(a) * * * *
(b) the assigned right is evidenced by a tangible token
or writing required by the obligor's contract for its enforce-
144 Harvard Law Review 101.
2Jones v. Integrity Trust Co., 292 Pa. 149.
8Matter v. Osborne, 209 N. Y. 450.
,'Uniform Principal and Income Act, sec. 5, n.
'Sec. 158.
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ment and this token or writing is delivered to the assignee.
(c) ** * *
In a recent number of the Yale Law Journal2 Mr. Paul
Burton contended that this rule was too restricted, and
that the delivery to an assignee of any written contract
between the obligor and assignor is a sufficient formality
to make the gift irrevocable. In support of his contention
Mr. Burton cited In re Huggins Estate,3 in which delivery
by the donor, with proper intent, of a written contract to
convey certain coal rights for $1800 was held to effect an
irrevocable gift of the right to the money.
In a reply' to the criticisms of Mr. Burton, Mr. Willis-
ton, the draftsman of the rule of the Restatement, objects
to any extension of the rule of the Restatement and par-
ticularly to the rule advocated by Mr. Burton and acted
upon by the Pennsylvania court in the case mentioned. Mr.
Williston objects to the rule suggested by Mr. Burton be-
cause of its uncertainty, because it is not supported by the
authorities and because the reasons advanced in its support
are not convincing. After stating a number of questions
to which the gift of a chose in action may give rise he
says, "The embarrassment of answering such questions and
the possible frauds that the questions suggest are reduced
to a minimum if the effectiveness of a gift by mere de-
livery of a document is admitted only whenthe document
is of a character that is essential according to law or busi-
ness usage for the collection of the claim".
THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AS AN
ALTERNATIVE REMEDY
The Yale Law Journal' in its Recent Case Notes dis-
cusses the case of City of Williamsport v. Williamsport Water
239 Yale L. J. 837.
3204 Pa. 167.
440 Yale L. J. 1.
'November, 1930, p. 129; 40 Y. L. J. 129.
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Co.2 "The plaintiff city had in 1920 entered into a consent
judgment with the defendant corporation whereby it was
agreed that the citS 'may and shall' take over the defend-
ant's waterworks at a stipulated price. The consent of the
city electors was a prerequisite to the transfer. After the
jtidgment had been entered, the electors voted down the
project. In 1927 a new resolution to take over the water-
works was approved by the electors. The water company
contested the city's right to buy at the consent judgment
price and the plaintiff brought an action to determine its
rights. The lower court dismissed the proceedings. It was
held on appeal that the declaratory form of action could
not be iivoked to determine the validity of a past judgment
but that the adverse vote of the electors had terminated the
city's right to take over the water plant."3
In its comment the note says, "Declaratory judgment
proceedings are now generally favored when the plaintiff
has no other immediate remedy.' There is, however, some
tendency, particularly noticeable in Pennsylvania, to refuse
such petitions if the plaintiff might equally well have sought
other relief." This tendency finds justification only when
a specific statutory remedy would have been available.
Certainly a petition for a declaratory judgment need not
2150 Atl. 65t (1930).
8Quotation of facts and holding from Yale Law Journal, pp.
129-130.
'Citing among other decisions, "Girard Trust Co. v. Tremblay
Motor Co., 291 Pa. 507, 140 AtI. 506 (1928)."
5Citing, "Appeal of Kimmell, 96 Pa. Super. Ct. 488 (1930); Leaf-
green v. La Bar, 293 Pa. 263, 142 Atl. 224 (1928); Dempsey's Estate,
288 Pa. 458, 137 Ati. 170 (1927); Ladner v. Siegel, 294 Pa. 368, 144
Atl. 274 (1928). See Taylor v. Haverford Tp., 299 Pa. 402, 406, 149
Atl. 639, 641 (1930); Sterrett's Estate, 150 Atl. 159, 162 (Pa. 1930).
But compare Malley v. American Indemnity Co., 297 Pa. 216, 146
Ati. 571 (1929). A reason for the tendency in Pennsylvania may be
its doctrine that the declaratory judgment should only be granted
when the plaintiff can show the necessity of a speedy determination
of the issues. List's Estate, 283 Pa. 255, 129 Atl. 64 (1925). And
this necessity will not be found present if there is other adequate
remedy. See Dempsey's Estate, 288 Pa. 458, 460, 137 Atl. 170, 171
(1927)."
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be treated as an extraordinary remedy. In the Williams-
port case, had the plaintiff been compelled to institute an
action for specific performance, or for execution of the old
judgment, the very spirit and purpose of the Uniform
Declaratory Judgment Act would have been frustrated.'
In fact, the court virtually declared the rights of the pe-
titioners, although it gave no convincing reason for its
refusal to issue a formal declaratory judgment.7  Perhaps
the reactionary attitude on the part of the formerly liberal
Pennsylvania court may be traced to an unwarranted fear
of overburdening the judiciary". 8
IMPLIED AGREEMENT TO BEAR EQUALLY
PREMIUM COSTS OF JOINT LIFE
INSURANCE POLICY
In re Montgomery's Estate, 299 Pa. 452, 149 AtI. 705
(1930). "Two brothers took out a joint life insurance policy
payable to the survivor. At the end of six years, during
which period premium costs were borne equally, one bro-
ther refused to continue his share of the payments; the
other, to keep the policy alive, continued to pay the full
amount. Upon the death of the defaulter, the survivor
6Citing among other decisions, "Kariher's Petition (No. 1), 284
Pa. 455, 471, 131 Atl. 265, 271 (1927)."
7"The court assigns no other reason for its decision.that the
Declaratory Judgment Act cannot be used to elucidate judgments than
that it cannot be used to elucidate judicial decrees, and cites Ladner
v. Siegel, supra note 5, where on a totally dissimilar state of facts the
court says at 375, 144 Atl. at 276: 'Construction of a decree cannot be
given until the question comes regularly before the court in proceed-
ings requiring construction and application to acts alleged to have
been done or omitted under it.' "
s"Total digested number of petitions for declaratory judgments
in the Pennsylvania Supreme and Superior Courts were: 1916-1927,
5 (evidently an error in 1916 date-Act passed 1923); 1924, (evidently
an error-should be, 1927) 4; 1928, 8 (after the Uniform Declaratory
Judgment Act had been found constitutional); 1929, 5; 1930 (Jan.-
July), U."
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collected the proceeds and sued the deceased's estate to
recover one-half of the premium costs. The lower court
held for the claimant on the ground that the facts gave
rise to an implied contract to share the premium costs
equally, and on appeal this decision was affirmed."
In commenting on this decision, the Yale Law Journal'
says, "In the clear absence of an express contract, the in-
stant court could have allowed recovery only upon the
theory of a contract implied in fact or a quasi-contract.
Contracts implied in fact as said to differ from express con-
tracts only in the method of proof and to arise under cir-
cumstances which show a mutual intent to contract. 2 While
such contracts have been implied principally in cases of
services performed, money loaned at request, and the like,
they may also arise wherever the 'circumstances* demand
the conclusion of a contract to account for them'., The
facts of the instant case, however, would not seem to
compel the implication of a contract. 5 Furthermore, since
the equitable doctrine of contribution is generally limited
to cases of joint obligations, and since, the present policy
being unilateral, there was no obligation to pay the pre-
miums, it is difficult to find authority by which the court
could have imposed upon the defaulter a quasi-contractual
duty to contribute. Likewise, where a policy beneficiary
has been held to a quasi-contractual duty of restitution to
one who has voluntarily advanced the premiums, it has
been on the recognized equitable principle of preventing
'unjust enrichment'. Although there appears no techincal
'unjust enrichment' in the present situation, nevertheless,
by virtue of the claimant's payment of the full premium
'November, 1930, p. 137; 40 Y. L. J. 137; from which the facts and
holding are quoted.
2"See Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 465, 468 (1857)."
3"See also Reitmyer v. Coxe Bros. & Co., 264 Pa. 372, 107 Atd.
739 (1919)."
4"See Hertzog v. Hertzog, 29 Pa. 465, at 469."
""Cf. Robinson v. Hayes' Estate, 207 App. Div. 718, 202 N. Y.
Supp. 732 (3d Dept. 1924); Butler v. Peters, 62 Mont. 381, 205 Pac.
247 (1922); 26 A. L. R. 560 (1923)."
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rates, the deceased, until his death, had 'actually received
the full benefit as an expectant, conditional beneficiary. Ac-
cordingly it seems probable that the court was influenced
in finding an implied contract as a basis for recovery rather
by the equities of the case than by any established legal
justification."
Book Review
PENNSYLVANIA PRACTIOE, PART 1
A selection of Statutes, Rules and Forms, with Anno-
tations, published by David Werner Amram in 1922, Re-
vised and Enlarged by Philip Werner Amram in 1930, Phila-
delphia.
The original edition of this book contained a table of
contents printed on the last of its 126 pages. It contained
no index. The present edition contains an index covering
pages 162 to 167 but has no table of contents. Neither con-
tains a table of cases nor a table of statutes. This suggests
that the books were intended for consecutive study by
pupils of the authors rather than as working books for the
busy lawyer, who frequently seeks to find the latest dis-
cussion of a point covered by a familiar case or well known
statute. A table of statutes would have made it easy to
turn to the discussion of the recent statutory changes in
the law relating to matters of practice but these can only
be found by one who knows the subjects to which they
relate. The last edition of Patton's Practice does not in-.
clude the statutes passed at the 1927 and 1929 sessions of
the legislature. Amram, of course, embodies these and
many late decisions in his new edition. He makes no ref-
erence however to valuable articles in legal periodicals, such
as the one on the Sci. Fa. Act of 1929 in the August number
of the Temple Law Quarterly nor is his citation of cases
exhaustive. No reference was found to the Acts of 1929
allowing other claimants to become parties to suits on
official bonds and for the consolidation of suits growing
out of the same accident. The decisions of the appellate
